The London-Zurich Agreements created the phenomenon of a state. It was very difficult for the two communities to collaborate in harmony within such a state, with a constitution that had no parallel anywhere in the world. Three years after the inception of the Constitution the first bloody incidents broke out, known as "the 1963 incidents". In my opinion, both Turkey and Greece had committed a big historic mistake by approving the Agreements and helping in imposing them on the Cypriot people.
Abandoning Cyprus after a four-year guerrilla warfare waged by EOKA, the Colonial Power chose to sow the seeds of disruption, as it did elsewhere. The Colonialists believed that they could plant those seeds through the London-Zurich Agreements. The Colonial Power managed to secure the support of the Turkish Cypriot leadership as well as of Turkey and Greece in implementing this policy.
The percentage of Turkish public servants and policemen (30 per cent), as required by the Constitution, was far higher than the proportion of the population, while the percentage of Turkish forces (TURDYK) was 40 per cent and that of the Greek forces (ELDYK) 60 per cent. Recognition of the right of veto by the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, separate courts, separate municipalities, and, above all, the presence of Turkish and Greek forces in Cyprus all appeared very attractive to the Turkish side and were considered its great success. However, it was the Colonialists who had really succeeded. All their efforts concentrated on doing everything within their power to secure the acceptance of a constitution that sooner or later could cause a clash between the two communities. They believed that, with the mutual destruction that would be created among the Cypriot people, they would secure their own military bases, which they had managed to consolidate with the Zurich Constitution.
Separate courts did not serve any purpose. On the contrary, there was the risk that justice would not be served properly. During the Colonial period Greeks used to be tried by Turkish magistrates and vice-versa, and neither side ever complained of discrimination. The aim of this change was to estrange one community from the other.
The separate municipalities were the basis of the division of the two communities. Also, as the proportion of public servants was not based on justice, it could become a source of conflict and disturbance between the two communities. Good relations could not be developed. On the contrary, a cold political atmosphere would prevail on both sides. The presence of the Turkish and Greek forces was totally inadmissible and unprecedented, because they would be the cause of clashes between the two communities, as was in fact the case later. What is more important, the presence of foreign troops was not in harmony with the nature of an independent state.
Another incomprehensible point was the guarantees of Turkey, Greece and Britain and the recognition of the right of those three countries to intervene. They could intervene with the slightest pretext and create inadmissible conditions, as indeed it has happened. The fate of the Greek Community was being determined by the Greek Government and that of the Turkish Cypriote by the Turkish Government. The United Kingdom always remained apathetic and indifferent to what was happening.
The aim of the Constitution and of the London-Zurich Agreements, which was none other than the ultimate clash of the two communities, did not take long to materialize. In December 1963, intercommunal troubles broke out. These clashes, which involved many victims and damages on both sides, ended with the division of the two communities by lines which were called "green lines." Efforts were being made behind the scenes by Western countries in order to send NATO troops to keep order. Fearing that the Cyprus problem would be withdrawn from the United Nations, the President, Archbishop Makarios, categorically rejected this solution, as a result of which United Nations forces were sent to the island. The countries contributing to the force were Britain, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Canada and others. Thus, the Constitution brought about the division of the two communities which had lived in friendship and harmony in the past.
What was the secret, however, of this peaceful co-existence of the two communities in Cyprus which had not disturbed their relations even during the Balkan Wars, the First World War or the Asia Minor War? It is easy to give an answer to this question. It is simply because there was no foreign intervention then. Friction between the two communities, however, began when there emerged the Question of the Colonialists to find the organs that could create conditions of disturbances and anomaly. And they did not hesitate to use people from both communities in order to achieve their aim.
Had the Greek side accepted the proposals of the British Governor Harding, which were mentioned earlier in another chapter, the Colonialists would not have had the opportunity to take revenge against the Cypriot people. Unfortunately, however, owing to the absence of vision and because of strict insistence on Enosis, Harding's proposals were rejected. The organs of the Colonialists were thus given the opportunity to act.
I have no hard evidence at hand, but, according to what was being said at the time, in order to impede further misery and bloodshed, Archbishop Makarios was inclined to accept Harding's proposals and follow a passive policy similar to that ofMahatma Gandhi for the fulfillment of his objective. Unfortunately, however, a group that did not face facts with realism expressed itself against the proposals. It was also being said at the time that had Makarios insisted on his policy, he would have been called a traitor. For this reason he rejected Harding's proposals, and immediately he was exiled to the Seychelles. This action of the British was incompatible with human rights and was at the same time an outdated method. The terrible days the country went through after the Archbishop's exile are well known. The Colonialists did not hesitate to use every means of torture and oppression in order to suppress the Greeks. The Colonial Power depended on the British commandos and Turkish auxiliaries for the implementation of these methods.
At every opportunity, the British urged the commandos and the auxiliaries to maltreat the Greek suspects in order to create a chaotic situation between the two communities. Using their puppets, they stirred up the masses. I therefore felt the necessity many times to intervene and use my prestige in order to prevent destructive incidents which were the aim of the British. My continuous interventions angered the British, as can be as seen from the following incident:
Late one evening, a Turkish Cypriot working for the Intelligence Service (the British Secret Service) came to my house. As I used to be his family doctor, I thought that he or someone in his family was ill and that was the purpose of his late visit. I said smiling: "You must have someone ill or some serious matter to come at this hour".
My visitor seemed to hesitate to express himself. After a brief silence, he said:
Doctor, I came to ask you for something and apologize for disturbing you at this hour. I considered it my duty to inform you that your interventions aiming at impeding the clashes between the two communities are being watched by both the military and police authorities. Your actions are an obstacle to their plans and I do not think it is necessary for me to tell you how much I will suffer if anything happens to you. For this reason I ask you, whatever the case, not to intervene. This is the reason for my disturbing you at this hour.
I thanked my Turkish compatriot because I was certain of his sincerity. It was not news to me that the Secret Service would not hesitate to execute me and any other person who would be an obstacle to its plans. I thought it correct to do as my visitor advised me. Following this decision of mine, the British managed to carry out their plans in Paphos. They created unfortunate situations between the two communities, just as they did in other parts of Cyprus. I must add that, though I avoided intervening openly, I took every opportunity to explain to my community this sly and divise policy of the Colonialists. They should not have been given the opportunity to implement their malicious plans.
This situation in Cyprus, as I have described it, continued until the beginning of 1959. The talks that were initiated at the beginning of 1959 between Greece and Turkey ended on 10 February 1959 with the agreements mentioned above. The agreements were signed shortly afterwards by the parties concerned. However, when they were announced it was observed that they could not satisfy either side. This is why the signatories of the agreements tried to calm down public opinion through statements. For example, Karamanlis made the following statement: "This is the happiest day of my life." Such statements were considered exaggerations. This is why some people interpreted his statement to mean that he felt so happy because he was thinking that he would get rid of the Cyprus problem which constituted a headache for Greece. Archbishop Makarios, who signed the Agreements on the part of the Greek Cypriot side, was obliged, in order to satisfy the fanatic supporters of Enosis to say: "These agreements are a step towards Enosis." The Turkish Cypriot side, having gained the most, tried to convince the Turkish Community that she had come out a winner. The then Prime Minister of Turkey, Menderes, and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zorlu, were considered by Turks to be heroes. Even before the London-Zurich Agreements, puppets of these two politicians dared say that both were superior politicians to Ataturk.
I shall never be able to forget how much I suffered psychologically from these stupidities. During those critical days of 1955-59,I was the chairman of the largest Turkish Club in Paphos. Even though I had this position since 1940, I decided to abandon it and withdraw because I could not listen to such stupidities. The insistence of some of our members to place photographs of Menderes and Zorlu in our Club gave me the pretext to resign. I opposed their proposal saying: "There have been many other Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, much more capable, but we have not put up the photographs of any of them. It would be ridiculous to hang up the photographs of Menderes and Zorlu."
They did not say anything for some time. Nevertheless, later on, when the matter was raised again, I considered it correct to withdraw not only from the chairmanship but from the club as well. The photographs of Djelal Bayar, Menderes and Zorlu were then placed in the club. The same people, however, who insisted with such frenzy on placing the photographs in the Club, were obliged to remove them about a year later, after the fall of Menderes and Zorlu in the 1960 coup d'etat.
I should not fail to mention that though the Menderes Government was being criticized for its policy on the Cyprus problem, the governments that succeeded it followed the same policy. Menderes' Government took advantage of the Cyprus problem in order to divert the people's attention from the disturbing social and economic conditions prevailing in the country. There was so much propaganda, and they managed to stir the chauvinistic spirit of the masses so much, that the governments that followed were obliged to keep up the same policy. Only a man of the caliber of De Gaulle could end this demagogy decisively, closing the road towards Enosis with political means and demanding the establishment of a non-aligned, independent Cypriot state.
It must be accepted that the passion of the Greeks for Enosis caused justifiable concern to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. As already mentioned, however, this could be prevented by peaceful political means. The worst part of the London-Zurich Agreements, as we commented at the beginning of this Chapter, was the fact that Greece and Turkey were guarantor Powers and that these two countries kept troops in Cyprus. These two facts encouraged both sides to create incidents.
In 1963, Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war. Nevertheless, with the intervention of the then President of the United States, Johnson, who had sent a severe warning letter to the Prime Minister of Turkey, Inonu, the danger was averted. In order to prevent clashes between the two communities, it was decided by the United Nations to send troops to the island. Furthermore, Tuomioja was appointed by the United Nations as mediator in order to examine the whole situation and prepare a report. Shortly after the assumption of his duties Tuomioja died and was succeeded by Dr. Galo Plaza who prepared his report at the end of March 1965. In his report, he excluded both Enosis and partition and recommended an independent, integral and sovereign state. On the whole, he tried to instill in the Cypriot people the idea that they feel and think as Cypriots.
Had the report of Galo Plaza been accepted, all the destruction and misery that followed would have been avoided. Unfortunately, as we shall see in due course, it was rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Greek Government remained indifferent and, what is worst, urged Archbishop Makarios not to take advantage of the report. This very important report was thus put aside. Shortly afterwards, it was decided that a dialogue should commence between Greece and Turkey. The then Prime Minister of Greece, Stephanopoulos, had entrusted the command of the national Guard to Grivas. Later on, we shall refer to Grivas' arrival in Cyprus in 1964.
This was the situation when on 21 April 1967 the coup took place in Greece and the colonels' Junta came to power. For those who had common sense all hope disappeared. Five days after the coup, which brought me despair and agony, I sent the following letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the ever memorable U. Thant:
Dr. IhsanAli
                                                                                  Paphos,
                                                                                  Cyprus.
26. 4. 1967
His Excellency
Secretary-General UNO
 Mr. U. Thant.
Excellency,
The new distressing and unfortunate events in Greece indicate that it is impossible to expect anything from the dialogue between Greece and Turkey.
It is distressing for all and especially for the United Nations to expect Turkey and Greece to decide the fate of the Cypriot people when they themselves are faced with such serious disturbances and anomalies.
The people of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks, save a handful of chauvinists and organs of the imperialists on both sides, are bitterly against the continuation of the dialogue. With this never-ending dialogue, Greece and Turkey are abusing the patience of the Cypriot people. Irrespective of the stance of the Cyprus Government, the Cypriot people cannot recognize the right to a dictatorial Greek Government to discuss their problem. Faced with this reality and in order to facilitate the Cyprus Government, I think that it is the appropriate moment for Your Excellency to take the initiative for the implementation of the Plaza report.
I am afraid that delay in taking steps in this direction will bring the United Nations face to face with a "fait accompli," an accomplished fact that would involve serious dangers for the region. Behind the disgusting situation in Greece a malicious game is being played by the big Powers, which can influence this island as well. My conscience obliges me to draw your attention to this point for the sake of peace and at the same time for the prestige of the United Nations. You must act before the twelfth hour.
I am a citizen who has contacts with the masses of Greeks and Turks and am in a position to assure you that 90 per cent of both communities favor the Plaza report. It is, therefore, the duty of the United Nations to act according to the true will of the Cypriot people and not that of the foreigners.
The bloodshed, the misery and the inhuman conditions created in Vietnam and other countries can be avoided in Cyprus with your efforts.
I am certain that you will appreciate the great importance of this matter and hope that you will not hesitate to act accordingly.
With respect
 Dr. Ihsan Ali.


Those who took power in Greece through the coup d'etat soon made clear their true intentions to place the Government of Cyprus under their influence and control. In order to succeed with their plans, they provoked conflicts and anomaly within the Greek Cypriot Community with the ultimate aim of removing the president of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios from his office.
I should not omit at this juncture to cite extracts from a letter sent to Archbishop Makarios on 9 May 1967 by the Organisation "Justice for Cyprus" which had its headquarters in Chicago and which was established with the purpose of helping in the Cyprus problem, as follows:
Your Beatitude,
On the occasion of the tragic events and the changes which recently took place in Greece, we wish to express to you our concern.
Speaking on behalf of the vast majority of Greek Americans in the region of Chicago, our organization condemns the military dictatorship imposed in Greece by force and the use of arms. We sincerely believe that the result of the death of Democracy in Greece will be a blow to the cause of the Cypriot people for freedom, and your Government will be exposed to dangers both internally and externally.
We advise you to be vigilant against a similar attempt of a coup on the part of the Greek officers stationed in Cyprus. It is certain that such a coup will cause a new armed confrontation with the Turkish military contingent, possibly accelerating a Turkish invasion.
The military dictatorship of Athens and its organs in Cyprus will never hesitate to sell out the interests of the Cypriot people, just as they did with the Greek people.
Your Beatitude knows the old saying: "You know what your enemies have in store for you. You have to be cautious with your friends."
Following mature suggestions, the Organization ended its letter with these words: "It would be better if the Republic of Cyprus remained free, sovereign, independent and non-aligned from both Greece and Turkey, with guarantees of her territorial integrity by the United Nations." The letter of the Organization "justice for Cyprus" shows how correctly the members of this Organization thought and how correctly they predicted the events.
As it was confirmed by the events that followed, the aim of the Greek Junta was to serve the interests of NATO whose target was double Enosis. At first they created an organization which they called "National Front," the aim of which was supposedly the realization of Enosis. Its purpose was to mislead some elements and incite them in order to create an anomalous situation. Although several facts became known to the Government in time, yet the situation was not confronted with seriousness and the organization managed to become stronger. Only when the "National Front" began to carry out acts of sabotage and political crimes did the Government realize the danger and was forced to take measures for its disbanding. Superficially, the organization was disbanded, but in reality its members continued to act treacherously. There is no doubt that the tough members of this organization were involved in the assassination attempt against Archbishop Makarios on 8 March 1970.
Shortly after these events, in autumn 1971 to be exact, Grivas secretly came to Cyprus. As confirmed by events, he was sent by the junta. He created "EOKA B", with "Enosis" as its motto, and began to carry out acts of sabotage and to commit crimes. All these developments should have induced the Turkish governments to move in order to prevent any tragic situation that would be disastrous both for the Turkish Community and for the Cypriot people as a whole. Being a guarantor Power, Turkey could have drawn the attention of the Greek junta by means of an ultimatum as it did in 1967 during the events in Kophinou.
Here arises an important question: Why did Turkey not do this? The vast majority of world public opinion gave the interpretation that the Turkish Government's indifference and inaction was the result of an understanding between the CIA and the Greek junta to dismantle the state of Cyprus. This is not excluded because it was known to all that the junta was an agent of the CIA. This indifference on the part of the Turkish Government was inadmissible and unforgivable, because, as a guarantor Power, Turkey was concerned for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
Although in Turkey many politicians and Government functionaries as well as many journalists knew that Denktash was introduced into the political scene by the British, yet all the Turkish Governments formulated their policies according to Denktash's advice and suggestions. It is known that it was not his nature to think and evaluate the true interests of Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots. His actions confirm what has already been said. For example, as soon as he became involved in politics he began to instill fanaticism and hatred in the Turkish masses against the Greeks and used the motto that the two communities could not live together. He also had the audacity to accuse as traitors those who had a different view. He went so far as to create a terrorist organization which maltreated many compatriots who opposed his policy. He even had some of them executed. It is unfortunate that he continued this same policy after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. He did not cease terrorizing the people who did not follow his policy. Unfortunately, the police assumed an inexplicable position of indifference.
Following the brief description of Denktash's terroristic activities, it will be useful to throw a glance at the bloody events that occurred three years after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Public opinion is well aware that the provocation of the bloody events in 1963 was part of a well-planned plot in which Georgadjis and Denktash played a significant role. Both acted for the benefit of foreign interests.
Before we refer to the bloody incidents of 1963, we shall look briefly at the events that preceded so that the reader may become aware that Georgadjis was a man of the CIA and that he was carrying out its orders. According to verified information from a reliable source, I learnt that the bomb placed at the monument of Bairaktar was the work of policemen under the orders of Police Constable Lagodontis who was a close associate and organ of Georgadjis and who was a stigma for the Police Force. The reason this bomb was placed was to create hatred and animosity in the Turkish Cypriots against their Greek compatriots. For this same purpose, and for no good reason, the same clique of policemen carried out searches of unsuspected Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish sector of Nicosia. During the same period and for the above-mentioned reasons, the same police officer and his men placed bombs at the monument of the EOKA fighter Markos Drakos, near Paphos Gate which is adjacent to the Turkish quarter.
Following these incidents and others of similar nature and in the atmosphere of suspicion that had been created among the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, an ordinary incident, exploited in the appropriate manner, set off the bloody incidents on a Pancyprian scale. During ordinary confrontation in the centre of the Turkish quarter, a policeman, supporter of Georgadjis, shot and killed a Turkish common woman. The supporters of Denktash, following his orders, took advantage of the incident and presented it as an antinational action. This was the beginning of the clashes between the two communities. Georgadjis who, unfortunately for the people of Cyprus, was at the time serving in the Government as Minister of the Interior, and Denktash, as leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, did all they could in order to create a chaotic situation.
At this point I wish to refer to an incident which will not only confirm the above but will also cause surprise. During those tragic days when the supporters of Georgadjis killed innocent Turks and the supporters of Denktash killed innocent Greeks, a Turk (it would not be appropriate to mention his name here) was in Denktash's office. At some stage the phone rang and Denktash answered it. At the other end of the line was Georgadjis with whom he began to laugh and joke as if nothing had happened. At the same time, their supporters were killing each other. These people were leading the two communities!
Furthermore, I consider it necessary to mention a very important incident, in order to better inform public opinion regarding the collaboration between Denktash and Georgadjis. They collaborated with the object of creating deplorable situations in our country in order to serve the interests of foreign Powers. As I said before, Denktash and his organization terrorized the Turkish Cypriot Community so as not to have contacts with Greeks. The object of this was to segregate the two communities and to achieve partition. For this reason, he persecuted those Turks who were against such divise efforts and who supported the policy of co-existence.
One of those Turkish Cypriots who courageously supported the policy of coexistence was Dervish Kavazoglu who was killed by Denktash's terrorist organization in an ambush. His Greek friend Mishaoulis was also killed with him. On the day of Kavazoglu's funeral, the body-guard of Archbishop Makarios, Poulitsas, came to Paphos by helicopter and visited me at my house. He told me that he had come to Paphos in order to take me to Dhali to attend Kavazoglu's funeral and read out the obituary. I enquired as to who had sent him, and he replied that he was His Beatitude's envoy. I commented that his Beatitude should have called me on the phone beforehand.
Naturally, it would have been more correct if I had told him that his Beatitude would have called me beforehand if in fact he was going to send me a helicopter to take me to Dhali. However, in order not to offend him, I made the aforesaid comment and did not go. Later, when I had the opportunity, I mentioned this incident to the Archbishop who told me that he was not aware of such a thing. This led me to the conclusion that Poulitsas was not sent by the Archbishop but by Georgadjis. This view was later strengthened by the complicity of Poulitsas and Georgadjis in the assassination attempt against Makarios. The object of Poulitsa's mission to Paphos was to take me to Dhali where someone would assassinate me during the funeral. Georgadjis puppets would then say that I had been killed by a Turk. Another of their objectives was to expose me as a communist leader of the Turks since Kavazoglu was a known leftist. To accuse a leader of being a communist constitutes a weapon in the hands of fascists. In one way or another, the objective was to serve Georgadjis's friend and collaborator Denktash.
However, I consider it useful to go on describing incidents regarding Georgadjis' activities. In 1964, Georgadjis went to Greece and invited Grivas to come to Cyprus in order to organize the so-called forces of resistance against the Turks. His true purpose, however, was to bring Grivas to create problems for Archbishop Makarios and exploit Grivas' presence here for his own ends.
It is remarkable that in a short while Georgadjis was disappointed with Grivas and managed to disturb the relations between Archbishop Makarios and Grivas. Behind that action there was some dark calculation. During that period he showed that he was on the Archbishop's side, and in exchange he acted undisturbed and uncontrolled - a situation which enabled him to succeed in his plans.
He placed his own people in the police force, the army, all government departments and semi-government organizations. Even those moukhtars (village headman) who were appointed were people to the liking of Georgadjis. He succeeded, in this way, in becoming the strongman of Cyprus within two or three years: he even dared defy President Archbishop Makarios himself. The worst and most dangerous of all that he did was to have armed many irresponsible and uncontrolled men. This man who, before EOKA, was just an insignificant employee, was so dazzled by the power and means he had acquired that he aspired for the presidency.
A large faction of the people of Cyprus understood what he was aiming at and began to worry about the fate of Archbishop Makarios and think that Georgadjis was even capable of murdering Makarios in order to achieve his objective. All those worries of the people were passed over to Makarios by friends, together with their own fears, but he did nothing about it. Many then interpreted this stand of his as a weakness. This is partly confirmed by the fact that, while he was aware of many suspicious actions committed by Georgadjis, he did not remove him from the Government until dictator Papadopoulos demanded, in an ultimatum, his withdrawal in the autumn of 1969.
Two interpretations can be given to the stand adopted by Makarios. The first is that he was really afraid, and the second is that he still kept him as a counterbalance to Grivas. The facts confirm that Georgadjis invited Grivas to Cyprus in 1964 for the above-mentioned reasons and not, as some naive people maintain, for organizing the Greek resistance against the Turks. Georgadjis was forced to resign after the ultimatum of the Greek junta. He never, though, accepted the idea of having been removed from power and, in order to be able to gain it back, he plotted with the junta clique in Cyprus. They planned and executed together the assassination attempt against Archbishop Makarios on 8 March 1970, which Makarios evaded, as if by miracle.
After the attempt of murder, Georgadjis repeatedly asked to see Makarios but his requests were rejected. As soon as the conspirators, friends of Georgadjis, heard of this, they feared that he might betray them. So, under the pretext of planning a new attempt, they took him out of Nicosia on the night of 15 March 1970, to a deserted place where they killed him. At this point, I would like to mention an action of the Archbishop, which, in my opinion, constituted an error. Although there were indications that Greek Junta officers were involved in the assassination attempt against him, he denied the rumors with statements that he made, and he kept denying them on every occasion. As a matter of fact, one could say that it constituted a big mistake, for, by making those statements, he covered them up in a way; as a result, they were encouraged to continue their plots shamelessly against him.
A lot has already been written on the assassination attempt against the Archbishop in 1970 as well as on the assassination of Georgadjis, so I consider any further talk on this subject to be superfluous.
We now come to Denktash's role. When the Archbishop proposed the "13 amendments" to the constitution, aiming at a smoother functioning of the state mechanism, Denktash, instead of suggesting to Turkey to consider the proposal with good will, did exactly the opposite. He exploited the proposal so as to provoke the bloody events of 1963. There is evidence attesting to that. For instance, before those events took place, he had forced the Turkish Cypriots living in towns to abandon their houses which were in Greek Cypriot residential areas. He had also forced the Turkish Cypriots living in mixed villages to abandon them, arguing that the Greek Cypriots were going to attack them. This plan aimed at the creation of fait accompli which would lead to the materialization of partition. Through terrorism, he tried to keep the Turkish Cypriot Community away from the Greek Cypriot. Since then, many Turkish Cypriots have thus become refugees.
The Greek Cypriot side is greatly responsible for the materialization of Denktash's plan. Firstly, because, when Denktash was exerting pressure on the Turks to abandon their houses and villages, the Greek side watched this happen without making the slightest move to prevent the materialization of this plan. Secondly, because, in some mixed villages some irresponsible Greeks, through ill-intentioned actions, terrified the Turks, and this forced the latter to abandon their houses, an action which proved to be of great help for Denktash's plans. The Government showed again complete apathy. But, how could anyone expect the Government to have taken the necessary measures since the Minister of the Interior was none other than Georgadjis?
Later, it became obvious that those irresponsible people terrifying the Turks were Georgadjis's instruments. Through these actions committed by the murderers acting under Georgadjis, Archbishop Makarios was being exposed and becoming the target of unjustified hatred on the part of some Turks. The Cyprus people are justified in presenting Denktash and Georgadjis as the bad demons of the country. As the events developed, it became common belief that the actions of both men served NATO plans.
Georgadjis and Denktash kept having a close co-operation in order to create a chaotic situation on the island, which would serve foreign interests. I shall state an incident which confirms my view. Many, I believe, know about the assassination of Ayhan Hikmet and Muzafer Gurkan. These two lawyers were against Denktash's policy and supported the co-existence of the two communities. Unfortunately, due to lack of experience, Gurkan, acting thoughtlessly and naively, visited Georgadjis in order to inform him that Denktash was preparing the ground to create bloody incidents between the two communities. This piece of information was passed over to me by his friend and collaborator Ayhan Hikmet who visited me in Paphos in order to ask me to receive Gurkan. Hikmet's visit to my house took place one or one and a half months before they were assassinated. As soon as I heard of Gurkan's visit to Georgadjis, I got terribly annoyed and upset and I said: "I believe that Gurkan visited Georgadjis in good faith in order to inform him of Denktash's actions and to prevent bloodshed between the two communities. I do not only consider this action of his as naive but also stupid, because Georgadjis is not different from Denktash and I can no longer meet this thoughtless man". Ayhan Hikmet got very embarrassed and insisted on my receiving Gurkan, but I categorically rejected his request.
I must admit that I supported, both morally and materially, the political activities of these two journalists and, as I was told by Ayhan Hikmet, the Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus Dirvana, too, encouraged them in their activities. Of course, I cannot be sure whether this is true or not. What I know for sure is that Dirvana did not approve of the Turkish leadership's policy. Whatever the case, Ayhan Hikmet did not convince me to receive Muzafer Gurkan. Because of his meeting with Georgadjis without having previously consulted me, I was so displeased with him that I not only refused to receive him but also decided not to meet ever again with him or Ayhan Hikmet. At the same time, I published in all Turkish newspapers a statement saying that I had no relations whatsoever with either of them or their newspaper Cumhuriyet and their party.
The following incident fully justifies my action. After their assassination, the Government brought the case before the court for supposedly ascertaining the motives. As proof, Georgadjis presented in the court the recorded conversation that he had with Gurkan when they met. The recording was made without Gurkan's knowledge. Georgadjis thus presented Gurkan to Turkish public opinion as a traitor. Public opinion both here and in Turkey, until the moment that the tape was presented, was fanatically against Denktash. This fact leads one to the conviction that Georgadjis deliberately presented the proof in court in order to get Denktash out of the difficult situation in which he had found himself.
I would like to take this opportunity to mention another incident which would give the reader the opportunity to understand that Britain, together with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, had managed to secure the co-operation of the Turkish Government and thus create a situation which served foreign interests. The assassination of the two lawyers upset Dirvana who, through a report to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, asked for the Turkish Cypriot leadership to be changed. This request was rejected. Considering this a matter of prestige and dignity, Dirvana submitted his resignation.
It is very easy to draw the conclusion that there existed a triple co-operation among Britain, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey, judging from the fact that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred to sacrifice a worthy ambassador rather than the Turkish Cypriot leadership.